Contracting Out Non-State Providers to Provide

Primary Healthcare Services in Tanzania: Perceptions of

Stakeholders by Maluka, Stephen
Contracting Out Non-State Providers to Provide 
Primary Healthcare Services in Tanzania: Perceptions of 
Stakeholders
Stephen Maluka*
Abstract
Background: In the attempt to move towards universal health coverage (UHC), many low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) are actively seeking to contract-out non-state providers (NSPs) to deliver health services to a specified 
population. Research on contracting-out has focused more on the impact of contracting-out than on the actual processes 
underlying the intervention and contextual factors that influence its performance. This paper reports on perceptions of 
stakeholders on contracting-out faith-based hospitals through service agreements (SAs) to provide primary healthcare 
services in Tanzania.
Methods: We adopted a qualitative descriptive case study design. Qualitative research tools included document review 
and in-depth interviews with key informants, and data were analysed using a thematic approach. 
Results: Stakeholders reported mixed perceptions on the SA. The government considered the SA as an important 
mechanism for improving access to primary healthcare services where there were no public hospitals.  The faith-based 
hospitals viewed the SA as a means of overcoming serious budget and human resource constraints as a result of the 
tightening funding environment. However, constant delays in disbursement of funds, mistrust among partners, and 
ineffective contract enforcement mechanisms resulted into negative perceptions of the SA. 
Conclusion: SAs between local governments and faith-based hospitals were perceived to be important by both parties. 
However, in order to implement SAs effectively, the districts should diversify the sources of financing the contracts. In 
addition, the government and the faith-based organizations should continually engage in dialogue so as to build more 
trust between the partners involved in the SA. Furthermore, the central government needs to play a greater role in 
building the capacity of district and regional level actors in monitoring the implementation of the SA. 
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Implications for policy makers
• The Ministry of Health (MoH) should ensure timely payments to the faith-based hospitals. In addition, local governments should diversify the 
sources of financing the implementation of the service agreement.
• The government and faith-based organizations should continually engage in dialogue so as to build more trust between the partners involved 
in the service agreement.
• A tailored training and continuous technical support of the central government are needed to make sure that the contracting-out frameworks 
in place are well adapted to the local needs. 
Implications for the public
This study provides the public with an understanding of the process of contracting-out to faith-based hospitals to provide primary healthcare services 
in Tanzania, that is yet to be sufficiently evaluated. Public understanding of the process could encourage their support for the implementation of the 
policy.
Key Messages 
Background
Global attention has recently converged on the need for 
countries to achieve universal health coverage (UHC), which 
aims to guarantee access to healthcare services without 
facing financial ruin.1 In the attempt to move towards UHC, 
many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are 
actively seeking to increase the contributions of the non-
state providers (NSPs). NSPs include all providers who exist 
outside the public sector.2 Some of the key NSPs in LMICs are 
faith-based organisations (FBOs). One of the most common 
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approaches to engage NSPs has been to contract-out the 
delivery of health services to a specified population on behalf 
of the government.3 A contract document usually specifies 
the responsibilities of the parties to the contract, the precise 
range of services to be provided, time span, the performance 
standards to be achieved, procedures for performance 
monitoring, and terms of payment and costs.4
Advocates of contracting-out argue that given the resource-
constraints of existing health systems, a more realistic 
approach to improving access to healthcare is to acknowledge 
and build upon the opportunities and resources of the 
NSPs.4-7 However, critics claim that, in the context of many 
developing countries, contracting-out may be unlikely to 
achieve its intended objectives for several reasons. These 
include high administrative costs, lack of sufficient providers 
for meaningful competition in many rural areas and the 
power of vested interests, which may try to gain control over 
the contracting process.4,8 Others are concerned about user 
fees associated with private health services. They maintain 
that increasing the role of the private sector limits the use 
of healthcare among the poorest, who cannot afford the 
services, consequently reducing access and equity in the use 
of healthcare.8-10
In Tanzania, the private not for profit sector – of which the 
faith-based facilities make up the overwhelming majority – is 
the second largest provider of healthcare in the country after 
the public sector.11 Although in Tanzania NSPs existed since 
the colonial time, the contract between the government and 
the NSPs was mainly founded on relational contracts.12 The 
Government formally negotiated the hospital agreements in 
1992 with faith-based facilities.12 The decentralisation policy 
led to the 2005 revision of the 1992 Agreements so that the 
contracts may be signed at the district level. Subsequently, in 
2007 a new type of operational contract known as the service 
agreement (SA) was introduced. The SA is a contractual 
agreement between the government and health service 
providers that defines duties and responsibilities of both 
parties. The SA requires districts to enter into formal contract 
not just to increase services, but also to bring services close to 
the people and at an affordable cost. The districts have authority 
to decide which type of the health facility to be contracted 
based on the needs of the districts. The health facilities 
could be hospitals, health centres or dispensaries. Since its 
endorsement and the signing of the first SA in 2008, more 
District Councils have entered into agreements with health 
facilities owned by non-state healthcare providers. By 2012, 
already 37 districts had entered into SAs with NSPs.13 
Several reviews of the literature have been already carried 
out on contracting-out experiences in developing countries. 
The first review which reported experiences of contracting 
out non-clinical services in Southern Africa, found mixed 
evidence of benefits of contracting-out to private providers.14 
The authors reported that in some countries such as Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, contracted providers could provide services 
of the same or higher quality at lower cost, while in Ghana 
and Tanzania, there were no significant differences in the 
performance between contracted and public providers.14 A 
second review focused on the capacity of contracting out 
strategies to benefit the poorest, and underlined the lack of 
robust evidence in that respect.15 A third review concluded 
that contracting out could be very effective and should be 
expanded, with more rigorous evaluations.16 Further to that, 
other reviews suggest that while contracting out has improved 
access to health services, the effects on other performance 
dimensions such as quality of services, efficiency and equity 
remain unknown.17,18 
In Tanzania, earlier assessments of the previous contracts 
have been done. These assessments reported that 
misperceptions and unfamiliarity hampered utilization of 
possible synergies.11,12,19,20 However, these studies focused 
on a different form of contracts which were negotiated and 
signed centrally by the Ministry of Health (MoH). This 
paper specifically addresses the new district contracts. The 
paper elucidates perceptions on contracting-out faith-based 
hospitals for the provision of primary healthcare services in 
Tanzania. Understanding the perceptions of stakeholders 
is crucial for proper implementation of the SA between the 
government and NSPs and could, in turn, help to assess the 
feasibility and sustainability of the SA.
Methods
Study Design and Settings
This study adopted a case study approach.21 The case 
study approach permitted the rigorous analysis of the SA 
between the districts and NSPs within its real-life context. 
The approach also made it possible to explore multiple 
perspectives of various stakeholders on the SA. Four district 
councils were purposively selected for in-depth analysis. 
The districts were selected from different health zones in 
Tanzania: Lushoto (Northern), Kilwa (Southern), Singida 
rural (Central), and Iringa (Southern highlands). Tanzania 
operates a decentralised health system, organized around 
three functional levels: districts (primary level), regional 
(secondary level), and referral hospitals (tertiary level). Within 
the framework of the decentralisation process, regions and 
districts have full responsibilities for delivering health services 
within their areas of jurisdiction, and report administratively 
to the President’s Office Regional Administration and Local 
Government (PO-RALG). 
Dispensary is the lowest level of healthcare delivery in the 
country, and is ideally run by a clinical assistant aided by 
an enrolled nurse; and offers basic outpatient curative care 
to between 6000 and 10 000 people. Health centres serve 
populations of about 50 000. Health centres are normally 
run by the Clinical officers supported by enrolled nurses. 
Most districts in Tanzania have a government-run district 
hospital; others rely on faith-based hospitals and they become 
designated district hospitals (DDHs) which are eligible to 
receive government subsidies. Several districts are grouped 
into a region, each of which has a regional hospital. This study 
focused on the SAs created and signed between the district 
authority and the faith-based hospitals. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the key demographic and health characteristics 
in the four study districts.
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Data Collection Techniques
To explore the perceptions of various stakeholders on the 
SA, we conducted in-depth interviews with key informants, 
including Council Health Services Board (CHSB), District 
Medical Officers (DMOs), the Council Officials, health 
facility owners and management teams of the health facilities. 
Interviews were also conducted with national and regional 
level stakeholders. As indicated in Tables 2 and 3, a total of 38 
interviews were carried out. Purposive and snow ball sampling 
techniques were used to recruit respondents. Interviews were 
carried out until saturation point was reached, meaning that 
no new concepts were identified in successive interviews. 
Oral consent was obtained from all those who participated 
in the interviews. All interviews were audio-recorded after 
obtaining verbal permission from the respondents. 
In addition, various documents including the SA template, 
the signed SAs, and hospital annual reports were reviewed. 
The documents were meant to supplement and cross-check 
information on the nature and content of the SA including 
the type of services the contract covers, the target population, 
the specification of performance requirements, and contract 
payment mechanisms.
Data Analysis 
Individual interviews were analysed for themes in three steps.22 
First, the notes from key informant interviews were manually 
open coded. Next, the codes and coding trees were reviewed 
and refined by going back and forth between the codes and 
the transcripts. In the third step, the codes of all interviews 
were organized into themes. The categorization of themes was 
extensively discussed among research team members in group 
meetings until consensus was achieved. Finally, data were 
summarised and synthesised, retaining as much as possible 
the key expressions of respondents. Responses from different 
types of respondents were compared to see where there were 
differences and similarities.
Results 
This section presents the findings from the analysis of key 
informant interviews with key stakeholders involved in the 
formulation and implementation of the SA between the 
district government and faith-based hospitals. Documentary 
data were used to support, verify and highlight the key issues 
that emerged. Verbatim quotes from the respondents have 
been included to illustrate the main messages communicated.
The Service Agreement Mechanism 
This section describes the SA mechanism in Tanzania. It 
describes factors that led to the creation of the contract, 
the process of creating and signing the contract, types of 
services covered, payment mechanisms and monitoring of the 
implementation of the contract. 
Why Did Districts Create Service Agreements?
The demand for the SA emerged from both the government 
and the FBOs. On the side of the government, there was desire 
to increase access to healthcare services to the population 
particularly in rural and hard to reach areas where the public 
health facilities were not available. The central government 
had established a policy of providing free maternal and 
child health services as part of achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals 4 and 5. Districts were, therefore, 
Table 1. Key Demographic and Health Characteristics of the Study Districts
Key Indicator Iringa Ikungi Lushoto Kilwa
Population 254 032 272 959 332 436 200 015
Population growth rate (%) 1.6 2.4 1.1 0.9
Hospitals 1 2 2 2
Health centres 6 3 5 5
Dispensaries 61 32 46 47
Source: District annual health plans (2017/2018); Census Report 2012.
Table 2. District Level Respondents
District Level Respondents 
No. of the Interviews
Singida Lushoto Iringa Kilwa
CHMT 3 3 4 3
The CHSB 1 - 1 1
Diocese Leaders (Bishops’ offices) 1 2 1 1
District legal officers 1 - - 1
Health facility providers and hospital 
administrators
2 2 2 2
Hospital financial officers - 1 1 -
Total key informants 8 8 9 8
Abbreviations: CHSB, Council Health Services Board; CHMT, Council Health 
Management Team.
Table 3. National and Reginal Level Respondents
Category of Respondent Role in the SA Number 
MoH, Community Development Gender, Elderly and Children 
(former Ministry of Health & Social Welfare) 
•	 Formulates the SA template (policy) and monitors the 
implementation of this policy 
•	 Finances SAs 
1
Umbrella Organizations - Involve the association of institutions 
with common interest in issues related to health
•	 They offer technical support to health facilities under their 
umbrella that have entered into SAs with the district councils
1
Development partners
•	 Provide technical and financial support in the development and 
implementation of SAs
1
RHMT
•	 Provide technical back up to the district councils in the 
implementation of SAs
2
Total Key Informants 5
Abbreviations: SA, service agreement; RHMT, Regional Health Management Team; MoH, Ministry of Health.
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required to provide free maternal and child health services. 
The lack of public hospitals forced the districts to negotiate 
with the faith-based hospitals to provide free maternal and 
child health services and subsidise user fees for the remaining 
services. The contracted faith-based hospitals became DDHs. 
“We needed to have a district hospital, and because our 
colleagues already had a hospital which had the right 
qualities of being a district hospital, we saw that it would 
be better if we started the process of entering into the SA” 
(Interview with a district health manager). 
On the side of the faith-based hospitals, there were increased 
demands for health professionals and declining financial 
support from the donors. It was evident from the analysis of 
the interviews with both district health managers and FBOs 
that during the early 2000s, most of the faith-based hospitals 
faced challenges in providing health services due to shortage 
of financial and human resources. Donors had significantly 
reduced financial support to the faith-based hospitals. 
In addition, the government had improved salaries and 
incentives for health personnel working in the public health 
facilities. As a result, medical doctors and nurses were moving 
away from the faith-based hospitals to the public hospitals. 
The faith-based hospitals could not generate enough resources 
for medicine and medical supplies, equipment, renovation 
of infrastructures as well as paying salaries to the health 
providers. Given this situation, the faith-based hospitals 
needed assistance from the government.
“At that time, we longed to become a District Designated 
Hospital (DDH) after seeing that the hospital had expanded 
and that there would be problems in paying our staff 
according to Government scales. We were used to paying our 
staff according to what we used to get. Considering the fact 
that we had qualified to become a DDH, we decided to apply 
for the status so as to provide services even better” (Interview 
with a diocese leader).
This was confirmed by the district and regional health 
managers as elaborated by one of them below:
“But even our colleagues on the other side had budget 
and human resource constraints. The donors had already 
withdrawn, and the staff were quitting the job from the 
religious hospitals to Government hospitals. As such they 
also started losing staff, besides the fact that they had many 
buildings and enough equipment. So they too realized that if 
they entered into this SA, they would revitalize” (Interview 
with a district health manager).
Furthermore, there was pressure from international actors to 
engage NSPs in order to accelerate efforts towards UHC. The 
analysis of documents and interviews revealed that a number 
of international actors played very crucial role in advocating 
the creation and implementation of SAs. The key international 
actors were: the Tanzania Germany Programme for Health 
Support (TGPHS) supported by the German Development 
Cooperation (GIZ and KfW), USAID and DANIDA. 
However, TGPHS seemed to play a leading role in the creation 
and implementation of SAs in Tanzania. For example, in two 
study districts, (Lushoto and Kilwa) the TGPHS played very 
critical role. Whereas KfW provided financial support to 
the districts to get into SAs, GIZ provided technical support 
through Tanzanian and international experts advising policy 
makers and implementers of health services alike. The GIZ 
also played very crucial role in building capacities of the 
involved parties to be able to effectively engage in discussions 
and exchange of experiences. 
How Were Service Agreements Created and Signed? 
The analysis of interviews and the signed SAs revealed that 
the districts had the mandate of creating and signing the 
contracts with NSPs, including private for profit. The key 
government actors at the district level were the Council Health 
Management Teams (CHMTs) and the District Executive 
Officer’s Office. On the part of the faith-based hospitals, 
the key actors involved were diocese leaders (owners of the 
faith-based hospitals) and the hospital administrators. The 
MoH was primarily responsible for the formulation of the 
generic SA template that was to be adapted by the districts. 
The Ministry also advocated the creation and signing of 
the contracts. The regional level provided technical back 
up to the district councils in the creation and signing of the 
contracts. 
The district governments formed teams of experts to facilitate 
the process of creating and signing of SAs. The negotiation 
process was accompanied by a number of activities. The 
faith-based hospitals received technical support from the 
Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC), an umbrella 
organization for Christian faith based organisations in 
Tanzania. The districts mainly got technical support from the 
MoH and the international organisations mainly the Tanzania 
Germany Programme for Health Support. 
The contracts were signed following successful negotiation 
between the two parties. The signatories from the local 
government side were chairperson of Council, District 
Executive Director in the presence of DMO and the legal 
officer of the council. From the faith-based contracted 
hospitals, the signatories were the diocese leaders and the 
hospital administrators. 
Which Services Were Covered?
In all the four faith-based hospitals, the SA mainly aimed 
at providing free maternal and child health services. 
Specific services covered included: antenatal care, delivery 
and postnatal care services; and Prevention of Mother to 
Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT). In addition, the 
contracted faith-based hospitals subsidised user fees to 
the general population residing in the district. However, 
in all the four districts, the contracted hospitals provided 
subsidised healthcare services to many other individuals from 
neighbouring districts which were not formally included in 
the contract. 
How Were Service Agreements Financed?
In two districts, the initial SA was funded by the GIZ. The 
contracted faith-based hospitals were paid fee for services. The 
GIZ disbursed funds to the district authorities. The district 
authority paid the faith-based hospitals for services rendered 
to pregnant women, children and other vulnerable groups 
of the population. The contracted faith-based hospitals had 
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to fill claim forms to be submitted to the district council for 
reimbursement in line with the agreed rates and conditions. 
However, after the GIZ had withdrawn financial support, the 
districts were not able to finance the contract using locally 
generated resources. Subsequently, the districts changed the 
mode of payment from fee for services to lump sum. The 
similar financing mechanism was reported in the other two 
districts which were not supported by the donors. The budget 
for the faith-based hospitals had to be included in the district 
annual health plans and financed by the central government 
using a basket fund. A basket fund is largely depended on 
the donor support through the central government. The 
contracted faith-based hospitals were required to receive 25%-
30% of the district annual health plan budget of the respective 
district. The formula for allocating funds to the districts and 
the contracted faith-based hospitals was determined by the 
central government. This means that funds disbursed by the 
central government to the contracted faith-based hospitals 
varied across the districts. Funds were to be channelled 
from the central government to the contracted faith-based 
hospitals through the district councils on a quarterly basis. 
Analysis of documents revealed that if the costs of providing 
free maternal and child health services were more than the 
services provided by the contracted faith-based hospitals, 
it was the responsibility of the District Councils to top up 
any extra amount stipulated in the SA for maternal and 
child health services. However, interviews with all types of 
respondents revealed that the districts only depended on the 
central government funding to finance SAs. 
What Were the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms? 
The central government had the responsibility of monitoring 
the progress of SAs implementation through quarterly 
technical, financial and progress reports. The faith-based 
hospitals were only eligible to receive funds following 
submission of quarterly technical, financial and progress 
reports. The central government also had mandate to conduct 
supervision visits to the districts occasionally. The Regional 
Health Management Team (RHMT) and the CHMT were 
responsible to oversee the technical implementation of SAs 
on behalf of the central government. The CHMT members 
had power to conduct spot checks in the contracted health 
facilities. 
Perceived Benefits of Service Agreements 
Respondents reported mixed perceptions on SAs. The 
government considered the SA as an important mechanism for 
improving access to primary healthcare services where there 
were no public hospitals. It was evident that the contracted 
faith-based hospitals did not charge maternal and child health 
services. In addition, the costs of other services were relatively 
lower than in other faith-based hospitals. 
“By having this hospital, many people are able to get 
treatment right here. Maternal and child health services are 
not charged. Even other patients are now treated at a reduced 
cost” (Interview with a district health manager).
The faith-based hospitals viewed the SA as a means of 
overcoming serious budget and human resource constraints 
as a result of the tightening funding environment. The faith-
based hospitals highly appreciated financial, human resource 
and other support provided by the central government as part 
of the SA. 
“The government is shouldering several costs, especially 
paying salaries and subsidies for medicines through the 
Medical Stores Department. To a large extent, it has reduced 
the challenge of paying salaries to staff ” (Interview with an 
accountant of a faith-based hospital).
Another respondent added:
“Leaving aside the general financial benefit, we also benefit 
in other ways; some of our staff are paid salaries by the 
government. We also get staff who are seconded from the 
district, especially doctors and nurses” (Interview with in-
charge of a faith-based hospital).
On the part of the government, the SA made it possible for the 
districts to have hospital infrastructures owned by the FBOs 
instead of building new hospitals. All district health managers 
reported that before signing of the SA with the faith-based 
hospitals, referral cases from the health centres in their 
districts were sent to the regional hospitals which were far 
from the population they serve. After signing the SA, services 
have been brought closer to the people. 
“The presence of the agreement has helped to bring health 
services closer to the people. In the past, patients had to be 
referred to the regional hospital, even those coming near the 
hospital owned by the non-state care providers. After signing 
the agreement, patients go to this hospital for services” 
(Interview with district health manager). 
Another respondent added:
“Firstly, we were legally obliged to have a district hospital. 
So by entering into this agreement, we got a district 
hospital. Secondly, we saw that our patients were facing a 
lot of difficulties going all the way to the regional hospital” 
(Interview with district health manager). 
Almost all government officials reported that following the 
implementation of the SA, there was increased utilization 
of maternal and child health services. The contracted faith-
based hospitals confirmed that they had been receiving more 
clients for maternal and child health services following the 
implementation of the SA. Some of the clients were coming 
from neighbouring districts. Such a situation increased the 
workload of health staff as well as extra cost for these health 
facilities. 
“Since the signing of the SA, we have been receiving many 
patients. Some patients come from neighbouring districts 
which are not part of the SA. We are working at a loss 
because we are spending more than what we receive from the 
district” (Interview with a faith-based hospital manager).
Another respondent added:
“Running the hospital is becoming difficult because the 
number of patients has increased, and not all of them come 
from within our district. They come from other districts 
and regions” (Interview with in-charge of a faith-based 
hospital).
Perceived Barriers to the Implementation of Service Agreements 
While almost all respondents acknowledged the importance 
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of SAs between the districts and the faith-based hospitals, 
they raised several concerns as outlined hereunder. 
Inadequate and Constant Delays in Financial Support 
The Government was to disburse funds to the contracted 
hospitals on quarterly basis. However, it was noted that there 
were significant delays in the disbursement of funds to the 
hospitals. This affected delivery of quality healthcare services 
in the contracted faith-based hospitals. 
“The main challenge is delay in funds. The district cannot 
send funds to the hospital, if we have not received from the 
central government. At least now the flow of basket funds is 
good. There was time when funds could be delayed even for 
six months. The hospital had to borrow drugs from vendors 
or use other sources” (Interview with district official). 
Another respondent added: 
“The money from the government usually comes late. It may 
be the case that it is a problem from the top. But when it 
comes, we already have used our resources, and we get stuck 
in one way or another” (Interview with in-charge of a faith-
based hospital). 
However, while the contracted faith-based hospitals felt that 
the funds provided by the government were inadequate, 
the district and regional health managers had a different 
view. According to our respondents, the FBOs had high 
expectations from the government. The government officials 
had the opinion that since the government took the burden 
of paying salaries for some employees in the contracted faith-
based hospitals and providing subsidies for drugs and medical 
supplies, the FBOs were supposed to use funds which they 
collected from user fees and other sources prudently instead 
of largely depending on the government. 
“The faith-based hospitals have high expectation from 
the government. They want everything to be done by 
the government. This is not how it is supposed to be. The 
government is only there to compliment” (Interview with a 
district health official).
Another respondent added:
“Sometimes the district does not have funds to send to 
the hospital on time. If you tell them to use theirs and to 
be refunded, it becomes a problem. Due to this, sometimes 
they even go against the agreement. You may find that all 
of a sudden they have put a poster, for example saying that, 
pregnant women should come with money when they come 
for service. So they work impulsively, which to us is upsetting” 
(Interview with a district health manager). 
Inadequate Transparency and Mistrust Among Parties
The analysis of findings indicated that there was lack of 
transparency in the planning and budgeting process. Health 
sector public private partnership (PPP) policy guideline 
of 2013 and district annual planning guideline of 2011 
require parties to the agreements to be involved during the 
preparation of district annual health plans and budgets. 
However, the study found that the contracted faith-based 
hospitals were inadequately involved. Consequently, in most 
cases, the contracted faith-based hospitals were not well 
informed of the amount of funds allocated in the district 
health plans to finance the contract in a particular financial 
year. The district officials also expressed concerns on the 
lack of transparency on the part of the contracted faith-based 
hospitals. According to the district health managers, during 
the hospital board meetings, the contracted hospitals did not 
disclose other sources of income they generated such as user 
fees, cost sharing, insurance and receipts in kind. 
“The hospital needs to be transparent. Our fellows (contracted 
hospital) do not disclose incomes generated from other 
sources. They only report expenditures related to basket fund. 
It would be good if they also disclose incomes generated from 
other sources” (Interview with district health manager). 
Another respondent added:
“The hospital does not bring a full hospital revenue report. 
Every time for them money is not enough, but what they 
get is not openly put. When the basket funds delay, they 
immediately start complaining. Just at the beginning of the 
month they want money from the basket fund. If it delays, 
they threaten that from the following day they would start 
charging the patients for the services. So we usually ask them 
“what do you do with your money?” Why don’t you use your 
money and get refunded? We do not need to take their money, 
but even knowing their income is difficult” (Interview with a 
district health manager). 
Lack of Adequate Contract Enforcement Mechanism
At the operational level, the contracts were managed by the 
hospital boards which were composed of members from both 
the government and the contracted faith-based hospitals. The 
hospital board was required to hold its meeting quarterly. 
While in some districts meetings of the hospital boards were 
reported to be held, in other districts, meetings were not 
consistently conducted. In all the four districts of the study, 
SAs were supposed to be reviewed after every three to five 
years. However, by the time this study was conducted, no 
district had reviewed the SA. As a result, SAs in all study 
districts continued to be implemented for almost ten years 
without any review. 
“The contract requires that reviews be carried out annually 
in order to identify challenges and opportunities for further 
improvement. In addition, the hospital management and the 
district health management are required to submit progress 
reports to the hospital board on quarterly basis. But in my 
experience, these reports are rarely submitted due to either 
negligence or lack of understanding of the importance of 
these reports” (Interview with diocese leader). 
Closely related to the above, the contracted faith-based 
hospitals were supposed to follow the Government price 
list indicated in the contract when charging health services. 
The price list was based on the Cost Sharing Guideline 
of 1997. However, the review of the hospitals’ price lists as 
well as interviews with officials from local government and 
contracted FBOs revealed that the contracted hospitals were 
setting their own prices which were higher than the prices 
indicated in the contract. According to the contracted faith-
based hospitals, the indicative prices were outdated and 
unrealistic. This was attributed to the lack of review of the SA. 
However, interviews with the MoH officials revealed that the 
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Ministry was in a process of reviewing the cost sharing guide 
of 1997. 
Discussion 
This paper aimed at understanding perceptions on 
contracting-out to faith-based hospitals for the provision 
of primary healthcare services in Tanzania. Understanding 
the perceptions of stakeholders is crucial for the proper 
implementation of SAs and could, in turn, help to assess the 
sustainability of SAs.
The SA was seen as an important mechanism that could 
be used for improving access to health services delivery, 
particularly in hard to reach rural areas. All faith-based 
hospitals included in this study were serving rural areas where 
public hospitals were not available. The contracted hospitals 
were reaching women who initially received suboptimal 
maternal and child healthcare services. The provision of 
free maternal and child health services and the subsidised 
user fees in the contracted faith-based hospitals, therefore, 
increased access to services to this hard to reach population. 
Previous studies have acknowledged the role of faith-based 
health service providers toward the UHC especially in areas 
where user fees are pushing majority into poverty.23-25 
In our study, the implementation of SAs was faced by a number 
of challenges. In the first place, while the districts had mandate 
and power to get into SAs with the faith-based hospitals, 
they did not have financial resources to pay the contracted 
hospitals. They depended on the central government through 
basket funding which is mainly funded by the donors. The 
scarcity and untimely payment of funds negatively affected 
the implementation of the SA between the districts and the 
faith-based hospitals. The shortage and significant delays 
in the disbursement of funds from the government have 
led to a negative perception about contractual relationships 
on the side of the FBOs. While the faith-based hospitals 
initially appreciated the support provided by the central 
government, the increased number of patients coupled with 
the shortage and delay in the disbursement of funds from 
the central government increased burden to the faith-based 
hospitals. This situation increased the risks of disintegration 
of the relationship between the public and the FBOs. These 
findings corroborate a study of the contracting experiences 
in Cameroon, Chad, and Tanzania.12 The authors indicated 
that the contractual experience between the government and 
FBOs extended responsibilities within the context of limited 
financial and human resources.12 The findings of our study 
suggest that local governments need to diversify the sources 
of financing the implementation of the SA through alternative 
financing mechanisms such as community based health 
insurance and National Health Insurance Fund. If the funding 
problem is not resolved, the contractual relationship between 
the district and the faith-based hospitals may disintegrate in 
the near future.
Closely related to the above, this study revealed mistrust 
among the contracted parties which also affected the 
implementation of the contracts. It was evident that the 
expectations of both parties were not met. The fact that parties 
had higher expectations than what was achieved suggests 
ineffective contract designing process. This finding suggests 
that the contract planning process should detail the scope of 
the contracts and be more specific. In addition to the payment 
mechanisms, for instance, the contracts should clearly specify 
expectations of both parties and performance requirements. 
There is need to continually engage in dialogue involving the 
central and local governments, service providers and other 
stakeholders so as to discuss expectations and build more 
trust between the parties involved in SAs.
Our study found that there was low capacity in terms of 
contract management especially in monitoring contract 
implementation. It was evident from the findings that the 
political will to transfer authority in the contract creation and 
implementation to the district level was not accompanied by 
the capacity building of the district and local level officials. To 
a large extent, the districts depended on the capacity building 
provided by the international actors, particularly the GIZ. 
This support was largely provided in the two districts which 
were under the GIZ programme. While the institutional 
frameworks in terms of organisational structures were in 
place, they lacked adequate capacity to implement SAs. The 
recent assessment of the contracting experience in Tanzania 
reported that no need assessments were conducted prior to 
signing the agreement; the parties did not discharge their 
obligations in accordance with terms and conditions of the 
agreements; and that monitoring and evaluation was not 
adequately done by the government.18,26 Likewise, another 
study on the contractual agreement between the government 
and faith-based health providers in Cameroon, Tanzania, 
Chad, and Uganda reported limited capacity in development 
and implementation of contracts between the government 
and the FBOs.12 
Closely connected to the above, our findings indicated 
inadequate contract enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms. Subsequently, contracts continued to be 
implemented for long time without review. Lack of review 
resulted in hospitals setting their own prices for services 
offered which were often higher than those agreed in the SA. 
The fact that there was no review of the contracts suggests 
that if the contracting experience were evaluated, they would 
most likely fail on many levels. Studies have reported that 
the success of SA between the government and the NSPs 
often depends on their ability to create accountability.8,17,18 
Good monitoring may ensure that the contract is followed 
continuously and provide information that could be used to 
improve services. 
The findings of this study suggest that building public-
sector capacity to work with the private sector, including the 
development of skills to negotiate and oversee contracts with 
private providers is imperative for achieving UHC. While 
the technical support provided by the development partners 
is highly appreciated, there are problems related to the 
sustainability. Over dependence on donors’ technical support 
also leaves the country’s domestic policy processes open to 
external influence resulting to a negotiated set of priorities 
that reflect some domestic needs and some technical, political, 
and economic considerations defined largely by the interests 
of donors. There is a strong need for the central government 
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to build internal technical capacity in supporting the districts 
to establish and implement SAs with the NSPs. This will 
ensure that the contracting-out frameworks in place are well 
adapted to the local needs. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study relied primarily on the review of documents 
and key informant interviews with various stakeholders 
involved in the development and implementation of SAs at 
the district level. First, the study did not interview service 
users in order to assess their experiences and perceptions 
on the health services provided in line with SAs. Secondly, 
this study did not assess the impacts of contracting-out on 
health systems performance such as equity, efficiency and 
quality. Notwithstanding these limitations, the study provides 
good insights on perceptions of various stakeholders on 
contracting-out to FBO to provide primary healthcare services 
in the context of poor resource settings. The lessons learned 
could be relevant to other countries which are implementing 
SAs between the government and NSPs to improve primary 
healthcare services. 
Conclusion
This study was one of the first assessments of the 
implementation of the SA between the government and 
the faith-based hospitals in the context of decentralisation 
process in Tanzania. The findings indicated that while the 
approach was seen as an important tool that could be used 
to improve access to primary healthcare services in rural and 
hard to reach settings, constant delays in reimbursements and 
lack of transparency and trust between the government and 
faith-based hospitals resulted into negative perceptions of the 
SA. 
The findings of this study have some policy implications. 
First, the MoH should ensure timely payments to the faith-
based hospitals. In addition, the local governments should 
diversify the sources of financing the implementation of 
the SA through alternative financing mechanisms such as 
community-based health insurance and National Health 
Insurance Fund. Second, there is need to continually engage 
in dialogue involving the central and local governments, 
service providers and other stakeholders so as to build more 
trust between partners involved in SAs. Third, the contract 
creation process should detail the scope of the contracts and 
be more specific. Last, a tailored training and continuous 
technical support of the central government and the umbrella 
organizations are needed to make sure that the contracting-
out frameworks in place are well adapted to the local needs. 
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